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RESEARCHNOTES
The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making of
ChristianEvangelicals in State Supreme Courts

Donald R. Songer
University of South Carolina

Susan J. Tabrizi
State University of New Yorkat Stony Brook
Much has been written recently about the emergence of evangelicals and others often labeled the
"new Religious Right" in American politics. However,little attentionhas been paid to whether officials who have been socialized in the denominationscharacterizedas being part of this Religious
Right actually behave differently in office from those broughtup in other religious traditions.The
present study begins such an inquiry by examining differences in the voting behavior of state
supreme courtjustices in three issue areas. Evangelicaljustices were found to be significantlymore
conservative than mainline Protestant,Catholic, and Jewish justices in death penalty, gender discrimination, and obscenity cases throughoutthe time period from 1970 to 1993. These findings
suggest that religious affiliation is an indicatorof a source of judicial values that is independentof
partisansources of values that have been discovered in previous research.

R
ecent trendsin politics seem to signal an apparentrise in the influence of the
Religious Right in American politics. While the impact of the new Religious
Right in political parties, elections, legislative politics, and presidentialpolitics
has become the focus of extensive recent commentary,its significance for the
courts has been largely ignored.This paper seeks to determineif membershipin
evangelical denominationsaffects the votes of state supreme court justices in
cases regardingobscenity,the deathpenalty,and gender discrimination.
It has long been known that religion has a role in determiningpolitical attitudes and guiding political behavior(Guth and Green 1991; Hertzkeand Fowler
1995; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Smidt 1989; Wald
1992; Wilcox 1986, 1996). David C. Leege writes that "religiousbeliefs and religious groups are at the foundationof a culture"(Leege 1993). Thus, religious
affiliationmay provide a useful indicatorof judicial values that has been ignored
by previous studies examining the impact of judges' values on their decisions.
Our hypothesis is that the judiciary is no exception to the influence of religion
and that religion in fact helps to shape the very decisions justices make in specific issue domains.We expect that religious affiliationis an indicatorof a set of
powerful socialization agents that may contributeto the developmentof political
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attitudes in judges and that those attitudes will in turn affect the decisions of
those judges. In particular,this analysis will focus on the effect of the affiliation
of judges with evangelical Protestantismupon the decision making of those state
supremecourtjustices.' The aforementionedinvolvement of evangelicals in the
contemporarypolitical debate makes this a timely and importanttopic in American politics.
Traditional Evangelical Political Involvement
Evangelicalpolitical involvement,althoughthe subject of increasingattention
in the 1980s and 1990s, is not solely a productof these two decades. In reality,
evangelical involvementcan be traced back to the Puritanroots of early American communities,alternatelyprominentand introvertedover the decades until its
featuredrole today.
In the nineteenthcentury,evangelicalism2was the dominantreligious tradition
in America (Himmelstein 1990; Smidt 1989; Wald 1992; Wilcox 1988). But with
the public relations defeat in the early twentieth century of the Scopes trial, in
which some evangelicals waged a battle against the teaching of evolution in
schools, many evangelicals retreatedfrom the political landscape (Himmelstein
1990; Speer 1984; Wald 1992).
With the growing importanceof social issues in Americanpolitics duringthe
1960s and 1970s, evangelical political involvement began to reemerge into the
mainstream(Himmelstein 1990, Wald 1992, Wilcox 1988, 1996). The 1970s saw
the election of Jimmy Carter, a born-again evangelical, to the presidency. In
1979, Reverend Jerry Falwell, with prompting and support from the political
right and conservative business interests, set up the Moral Majority as an organizational body intended to serve as a mobilizing force for the growing
evangelical movement.
Although the presidentialcampaign of RepublicanPat Robertsonwas unsuccessful in 1988, his response in creatingthe ChristianCoalition in 1989 and its
activity in politics thereafteris testamentto the staying power of the Religious
Right. Recent political activity in the congressional elections of 1994 as well
as the presidentialbid of Pat Buchanan, a conservative Catholic, in 1996 suggest the continued and diversifying influence of religion in American politics
(Deckman 1995; Green and Guth 1988; Green, Guth, and Hill 1993; Guth and
Green 1991; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Wilcox 1996). Studies indicate that evangelicals, both in the mass public and among political elites, hold conservative
1Throughoutthis paper the term "state supremecourt"will refer to the highest appellatecourt in
each state.
2A definition of the the term "evangelical"is a major obstacle in the literature.Although we will
specify a workingdefinitionfor the term in the context of our study later in the paper,in this context
it refers to white Protestantdenominationsthat believe in biblical inerrancyand salvation through
Jesus Christ.
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issue stances and are increasinglyactive in terms of electoral turnoutand political lobbying (Guthand Green 1991; Kellstedt, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1991; Rozell
and Wilcox 1995; Tabrizi 1996; Wald 1992; Wilcox 1996).
The present study will attemptto ascertain if the influence of the Religious
Right on American society can be evidenced in the Americanjudicial system,
specifically in the votes of evangelicaljustices sitting on state supremecourts, in
the areas of obscenity,the death penalty,and gender discrimination.We hypothesize that the conservative leanings of the Religious Right will be reflected in
these votes, suggesting that evangelical religious values have an impact on
Americanpolitics beyond the electoral ballot box.
A Conceptual Definition of Evangelicals
A major dilemma when studyingthe political behaviorof evangelicals comes
from the ambiguousness of the term itself. Three approacheshave frequently
been used to identify evangelicals: doctrine, self-identification,and denominational affiliation (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege 1993). Classifying evangelicals by
religious doctrine yields a religiously heterogeneous group with regard to denominationalaffiliationbut can be difficult to operationalize.Self-identification
consists of including as evangelicals those people that identify themselves as
such. The obvious problemhere is that there is no requiredconsistency as to the
reasons why some identify themselves as evangelical, and thus the term becomes
completely subjective.
For this study,we adopt the thirdapproach:defining evangelicals by membership in a religious denomination.While denominationalidentificationdoes not
always get at the intricaciesof belief that may create markeddifferences in people's religious and political attitudes, it has the virtue of producing a highly
reliable measure.
Moreover,Kellstedtand Green (1993) state that a "denominationis a set of religious institutions that are formally linked to one another, and which share
common beliefs, practices and commitments"(54). They suggest that the roles
religious organizationsplay in creating similar views among their membersand,
even more basically, the influences they have in early socialization result in denominational preference being a reflection of a "personal attachment to a
particularversion of such a tradition"(54).
Thus, we expect that denominationalaffiliation will be a valid indicator of
political beliefs. Admittedlywe are unable to explore concepts such as religious
salience and participationthat have been shown to be factors in the impact religion has on politics. However,these aspects of religious beliefs occur within the
context of a particulardenomination,indicatingthat they are shapedby that initial environment(Kellstedt and Green 1993).
The argument is that just as party identification reflects certain beliefs of
members independent of ideological intensity and activity, denominational
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preference "may encapsulate differences in belief practice and commitment,
even for individualswith nominal religiosity" (55). Because denominationalaffiliation cuts across the lines of party identification,we hypothesizethat religion
reflects a source of attitudesthat is, at least in part, independentfrom the partisan sources of attitudesthat have been more thoroughlyexamined in studies of
judicial behavior.
We will be adoptingKellstedt and Green'sclassification of religious denomination for application in this study. The authors have constructedthis scheme
using a classification system based on distinctionsbetween denominationalfamilies and religious movements, ultimately grouping denominationsaccording to
"comparablebeliefs and ethos" (58).3
Kellstedt and Green (1993) recognize that these categories are often hard to
measure and thus defining denominationsbased on them is imprecise. They attempt to overcome these difficulties by using the family and movement
categories together to define religious traditions. Mainline Protestantsinclude
ritualistic families influenced by church movements: Anglican-Episcopal;
Congregational-United Church of Christ; Lutheran-Evangelical Lutheran
Churchin America; Methodist-United Methodist Church;Nondenominational
Mainline; Presbyterian-Presbyterian Church (USA); Reformed-Reformed
Church in America; Restorationist-Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).
Evangelical Protestantsinclude pietist families and sect movements: BaptistSouthernBaptist Convention,AmericanBaptist ChurchesUSA, Baptist General
Conference;Holiness-Christian and MissionaryAlliance, Churchof the Nazarene, Free Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church; LutheranMissouri Synod, Wisconsin Synod; Nondenominational Evangelical; Pentecostal-Assemblies of God, Church of God (Tennessee); PresbyterianPresbyterianChurch in America, Orthodox PresbyterianChurch; ReformedChristian Reformed Church; Restorationist-Churches of Christ; OthersSeventh-Day Adventists, Mennonite Church, Evangelical Free Church, Evangelical CovenantChurch,Plymouth Brethren(Kellstedt and Green 1993).
3Kellstedt and Green (1993) divide denominationalfamilies (groups of individualdenominations
sharing historical, theological and ethnic/racialcharacteristics)into two categories ritualistic and
pietist (Swierenga 1990, 151-52; cf. Sommerfield 1968) with regard to levels of institution and
centralizationwithin the denominationalfamily. Ritualistic families stress "centralizedreligious authority,formalizedrituals, and official creeds"(57). Denominationsare pluralisticwithin the family.
"Pietist families place greater emphasis on the unmediatedcontact between believers and God and
are thus characterizedby decentralizedreligious authority,informalworship, individualreligious experience, and emphasis on righteous behavior"(57). These denominationsare particularisticwithin
the denominationalfamily.
Religious movements (attemptsat change within denominations)are classified as church or sect
movements(Starkand Bainbridge1985). Churchmovementsseek accommodationand the reduction
of differenceswith a broadculture.They tend to produce liberaldenominationswith an emphasis on
acceptance. Sect movements seek "separationfrom the broaderculture,"producingconservativedenominationswith a conversionistethos (Kellstedt and Green 1993, 57-58).
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Research Design
The data for the analyses below consist of the universe of the obscenity and
gender discriminationpolicy decisions with published opinions and a random
sample of 30 death penalty decisions per year for the years 1970 through 1993.4
Westlawsearcheswere designed to identify all the publishedcases in each issue
area. Decisions that decided purely factual disputes (e.g., whetherthe defendant
was actuallythe owner of the obscene materialsfound in the searchof her house)
without interpretingthe meaning of any precedent or addressing any policy
question were excluded from analysis. After cases with missing data were excluded, the number of judges' votes suitable for analysis was 3,909 from death
penalty cases, 437 votes from gender discriminationcases, and 2,023 from obscenity cases. Data on the backgroundcharacteristicsof the judges whose votes
are analyzed were obtained from standardbiographic sources including The
AmericanBench and Whos Whoin AmericanLaw.
The unit of analysis for the models describedbelow is the vote of each judge
on each case. For each issue area, an integratedmodel was createdto assess the
effects of judicial attitudes, changing policy from the United States Supreme
Court, contextualpolitical influence, and case facts specific to the particularissue area.
A dilemma facing those seeking to increase our understandingof appellate
court decision making is that integratedmodels will be incompletely specified
unless they include the particularcase facts that are most relevantfor the type of
cases examined. These case facts differ among different types of issues.
Consequently,it is impossible to develop comparablemodels for different case
types unless the models are underspecified. Given this dilemma, the present
study creates separatemodels for each of the three issue areas examined,with a
core of common variablesplus the additionof separatecase facts for each issue
area.5Common measures of judicial attitudes,SupremeCourt change, and contextual influence were coded for all cases in each of the three issue areas. In
addition,since the main theoreticalinterestof the presentanalysis is the effect of
the religious affiliations of judges, the same measures of judge religion were
used for the three issue areas.
Case facts used in each model were derived from previously successful integratedmodels of appellatedecision making in each issue area. More specifically,
the case facts used in the model of death penalty decisions combined facts previously discovered to be significantly related to state death penalty decisions
4Since there were more than 10 times as many death penalty decisions than gender discrimination
decisions in most years, it was not feasible to code all the death penalty decisions.
5However, the additionof case facts does not appearto substantivelyaffect conclusions about the
effect of religion on judicial votes. When a model containingonly the common core variables(without case facts) was run, the direction and level of significance was the same in all three issue areas
as in the more fully specified models presentedbelow.
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(Brace and Hall 1995) and United States SupremeCourtdeathpenalty decisions
(George and Epstein 1992) in partiallyoverlappingtime periods. The case facts
used in the model of gender discriminationcases were drawnfrom those used by
Wolpert(1991) in her analysis of SupremeCourtdecision making and by CrewsMeyer and Anderson (1994) in their analysis of decisions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals and state supremecourts.The case facts used in the model of obscenity
decision making were derived from the analysis of obscenity decisions in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals (Songer and Haire 1992).
Because least squaresregressionis inappropriatewhen the dependentvariable
is dichotomous, as in the present analysis (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), the parameters of the models were estimatedby logit, a maximum likelihood estimation
technique.This method producesestimates for the parametersof a model's independentvariablesin terms of the contributioneach makes to the probabilitythat
the dependentvariablefalls into one of the designatedcategories (e.g., a liberal
or conservative vote). For each independent variable, a maximum likelihood
estimate (MLE) is calculated along with its standarderror (SE). The MLEs
represent the change in the logistic function that results from a one-unit
change in the independentvariable.
Specifying the Components of an Integrated Model
A consensus appearsto be growing that for most courts in the United States
(except possibly the United States SupremeCourt),judicial decisions are the result of a myriad of forces that limit and shape (but do not eliminate) the
expression of judicial preferences (e.g., Brace and Hall 1995a; George and
Epstein 1992; Hall and Brace 1992, 1994; Emmert 1992; Songer and Haire
1992). All sharethe view thatjudicial decisions are the productof a complex set
of relationshipsamong interactingvariables.
Drawing on the groundbreakingwork of Richardsonand Vines (1970), virtually all of the new wave of integratedmodels of appellatecourt decision making
include, in some fashion, the notion thatjudges respondto pressuresfrom both
the legal and the democratic subcultures. Integratedmodels of judicial decision making also typically include one or more indicatorsof judicial values and
contextual or environmentalpressures that may impinge on judicial decision
making.
The dependentvariablefor each of the models is the directionof each judge's
vote. A liberal vote was coded 1 and a conservativevote was coded 0. A liberal
vote was defined as one striking down the death penalty or overturninga sentence of death in a death penalty case; or that narrows the gender gap in a
gender discriminationcase; or that supportsgreaterprotectionfor asserted First
Amendmentclaims, or is less restrictiveof materialthat is alleged to be obscene
in obscenity cases.
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Independent Variables Common to Models in All Three Issue Areas
The focus of the analysis below was the effect of judges' religion on their
votes. Three dummy variableswere created as indicatorsof judge religion. The
variableCatholic was coded 1 if the judge was a Roman Catholic, 0 otherwise.
Similarly,the variable"Jewish"was coded 1 if the judge was Jewish and 0 otherwise. Finally, the variable "Evangelical"was coded 1 if the judge was a
white/Caucasian,evangelical Protestantand was coded 0 for all other judges.
Evangelicals were defined as all those who claimed to be affiliated with the
SouthernBaptists,American Baptist, or the Baptist General Conference;any of
the Holiness churches including the Christianand MissionaryAlliance, Church
of the Nazarene, Free MethodistChurch,Wesleyan Church;the Missouri Synod
or Wisconsin Synod Lutherans; Orthodox Presbyteriansor the Presbyterian
Churchin America;Pentacostalslike the Assemblies of God, Churchof God, or
the Christian Reformed Church; or the Churches of Christ, Seventh-Day
Adventists, or the Evangelical Free Church.6The excluded category that serves
as the referencegroup for these three dummyvariablesis the group of mainline
Protestants,including members of the Episcopal Church,the United Churchof
Christ, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the United Methodist
Church,and the PresbyterianChurchUSA.7
Building on previous integrated models of judicial decision making, the
models below also contain common indicators of judicial attitudes, changing
SupremeCourtpolicy, and a measureof the context of judicial decision making.
In addition,each model contains a series of variablesto capturethe effects of the
case facts hypothesized to be most relevantfor each given policy area. A summary list of all the variablesused in the models is providedin table 1.
Unfortunately,direct, independentmeasures of the ideology of the hundreds
of judges who have served on the 52 state supremecourts since 1970 do not exist; nor is it feasible to obtain them. Therefore,the best that can be done is to
select an indicatorthat will serve as an inferentialmeasure of judicial ideology.
The best indicatorthat is readily availablefor most state supremecourtjudges is
political party affiliation.A wide variety of studies suggests that party identification provides a rough indicatorof the ideology of appellate courtjudges and
that Democratic judges (coded 1) are generally more liberal than Republican
judges (coded 0) in most issue areas of civil liberties and economic regulation
(Goldman 1975; Hall and Brace 1992; Songer and Haire 1992; Tate 1981).
6This classificationis taken from Kellstedt and Green 1993.

Judges whose religion could not be ascertainedor whose religious affiliation did not fit one of
these four categories (e.g., Russian Orthodox) were excluded from analysis. The total number of
cases excluded from analysis because of missing data (primarilymissing data on the religion or political party of the judge) was 1,518 votes for death penalty cases, 961 for obscenity cases, and 313
for gender discriminationcases.

TABLE1

Summary of Variable Descriptions
VariablesCommon to All Models
Partyidentification
Prosecutor
SupremeCourtpolicy
State citizen ideology
Electedjudge

1 = Democrat,O=Republican
1 = formerprosecutor;0 = no prosecutorialexperience
0 = WarrenCourt,adding 1 for each replacementof a WarrenCourt
justice with a Republicanappointee;maximum = 7
100 = most liberalmass political ideology
0 = most conservativemass ideology
1 = judge from state with eitherpartisanor nonpartisanelection of
judges;
0 = merit, appointment,or legislative selection of judges

Party competition

1 = complete competition,0 = no competition

Evangelical
Catholic

1 = judge is white/CaucasianevangelicalProtestant,0 = other
1 = judge is Roman Catholic,0 = other
1 = judge is Jewish, 0 = other

Jewish

Case Facts. Death Penalty
Female victim
Police officer victim
Multiple murders?

Rape
Robbery
Death-qualifiedjury?
Crime

1=
1=
1=
1=
1=
0=
0=

yes, O = no
yes, O = no
yes, O = no

defendantaccused of murder+ rape, 0 = no rape charge
defendantaccused of murder+ robbery,0 = no robberycharge
defendantsay yes, 1 = no claim
intentionalmurder,1 = lesser charge

Case Facts. GenderDiscrimination
Facial
Policy type

Benign
Real differences
Scrutiny

1 = facial discrimination,0 = no
1 = civil, 0 = criminal
1 = discriminationdefendedas benign
0 = no such defense
1 = discriminationdefended as responseto real differencesbetween
genders,0 = no such defense
2 = strictscrutiny
1 = intermediatescrutiny
0 = rationalbasis test

Case Facts: Obscenity
Film
Text
Pictoral
Adults
FirstAmendment
Scienter

1 = alleged obscene materialwas a film or video, 0 = other
1 = alleged obscene materialwas primarilytextualmaterial,0 = other
1 = alleged obscene materialwas a magazine that was primarily
picturesratherthantext, 0 = other
1 = alleged obscene materialwas not restrictedto adultuse, 0 = other
1 = defendantattackedrestrictionon FirstAmendmentgrounds,
0 = other
1 = defendant'sprimarydefense was thatprosecutionhad not proved
scienter; 0 = other
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Prior career experiences may also contributesignificantlyto the socialization
of judges. In particular,previous scholarshipsuggests thatjudges with prior experience as a prosecutorwill be more conservative in civil liberties cases than
judges without such experience (Tate 1981). Thus, as a second measure of judicial attitudes,we coded whethera judge had served as a prosecutor(coded 1) or
not (coded 0) prior to becoming a justice.
Although several dramaticexamples of noncomplianceby lower courts have
been documented,the availableevidence suggests that the normal patternis the
acceptanceby lower courts of clear precedentestablishedby the SupremeCourt
(Baum 1978; Songer and Sheehan 1990). Moreover,a numberof studies suggest
that across a broadspectrumof issue areas, lower courts are responsiveto changing SupremeCourtpolicy (Baum 1980; Johnsonand Canon 1984; Songer 1987;
Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). In each of the three
issue areas analyzed below, the legal model suggests that state supreme courts
will be responsiveto the changing constitutionalinterpretationsby the Supreme
Court.Unfortunately,no easily quantifiablemeasureof changing SupremeCourt
policy that would apply to all three areas is available.Since it is well established
that changing SupremeCourtpolicy is closely relatedto the changing ideological composition of the Court, the analysis below uses, as a surrogatefor such a
direct measure of changing policy, a measure of the changing ideological composition of the Court. Specifically,we adaptedthe measureused by Segal (1984)
that takes the value of zero duringthe WarrenCourt and increases by one each
time a WarrenCourt member was replaced by an appointee of Nixon, Reagan,
or Bush. It is expected that state supremecourts will respond directly to changing SupremeCourtpolicy.8
Strongrelationshipsbetween the votes of state courtjudges and the values that
are dominantin the political environmentof the state are expected even though
previous studies have not clearly established the precise mechanisms that link
environmentalvalues to judicial votes. This relationshipbetween the environment and judges' votes may be mediated through a selection system in which
local elites work to insure the selection of judges who share the dominantstate
values. Alternatively,even in the absence of any direct attemptto select judges
who mirrorthe dominantpolitical values, judges may experience the same socializationexperiencesthatproduceda given set of values in other state residents
and adopt similarvalues as a result. Finally,even when judges do not sharelocal
values, they may respond to those values in orderto maintainthe legitimacy of
their court, to assure their own reelection or reappointment,or to avoid informal
social sanctions. Since none of these possible links are mutually exclusive, it is
possible that any observed links betweenjudicial voting and the dominantstate
political values result in part from all three mechanisms.
8Since liberalvalues of the dependentvariableare coded 1 while higher values of the change variable indicate a more conservative Supreme Court, it is expected that the sign of the relationship
between these two variableswill be negative.
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An extensive literaturehas documentedan association between the dominant
values of the home state or region of elites and the political positions they take.
Most of the studies of such linkages have used region as a surrogatefor common
political cultureor values. Although the utility of region has been demonstrated
in many analyses of both courts and legislatures, the variable provides at best
only a rough indicatorof local opinions and values. In addition,region as a variable is not able to capturechange over time in local opinions or moods. Recently,
however,a new measurehas been developed that overcomes these shortcomings
of region as a measure of the influence of state culture and values. Berry et al.
(1998) have created a measure of citizen ideology for each state for each year
from 1960 through 1993. The score is derivedfrom an analysis of the voting behavior of the members of Congress from each state in combination with an
analysis of the partisancomposition of state and national officeholdersfrom the
state. Analyses reportedby Berry et al. provide convincing evidence that this
measure is both valid and highly reliable. We adopt this measure, called Citizen
Ideology, as a control for the dominantvalues of each state. The variabletheoretically runs from 0 (most conservative)to 100 (most liberal).9
Recent analyses by Hall and Brace (1989, 1992, 1994a) suggest that the institutional characteristicsof state courts may affect the extent to which the values
of judges are reflected in their decisions. To control for such effects, we added
measures of two institutionalfeaturesthat appearto have the most direct impact
on judicial voting: the method of judicial selection in the state and the extent of
party competition in the state political system. As our control for method of selection, we employed a simple dichotomybetween states that directly elect their
judges (either throughpartisanor nonpartisanelections), coded 1, and all other
states, coded 0. For our measureof state party competition,we employed one of
the most widely used indicators,the folded Ranney Index. This composite measure, based on the percentage of seats won by each party in state house and
senate elections, the percentageof gubernatorialvictories by each party,and the
proportion of the Democratic vote in gubernatorialelections, ranges from a
value of 0.50 for no competition to 1.0 for perfect party competition. For the
years in our analysis before 1978, the index constructedfor the years 1962-73 is
used (Ranney 1976). For the remainingyears in our analysis, the index derived
from 1981-88 data (Bibby et al. 1990) is used.
Case Facts Used as Controls for Each Model
Most integrated models of judicial decision making have derived the case
facts included in their analyses from among the readily identifiablefacts thatju9While we believe that the measureof citizen ideology is superiorto all commonly used measures
of region, we reranthe models below twice, once using a simple North-South regional dichotomy
and once with a four-wayclassificationof region. Use of these measuresof region in place of citizen
ideology did not substantiallyreduce the effects of religion reportedbelow.
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dicial doctrine has identified as relevantto the resolution of the conflict before
the court. Both the advocates of the importanceof the legal model for judicial
decision making and those who maintainthe primacy of judicial attitudesare in
agreement that a properly specified model of judicial decision making must
identify the set of case facts that are most relevantto judicial decisions in a given
case category. The case facts employed in each model below are primarily
viewed as control variables to insure that any associations discovered between
religion and judicial decisions are not an artifact of some correlationbetween
particulartypes of cases and the concentrationof particularreligions in regions
giving rise to those types of cases.
The model of deathpenalty decisions includes three victim characteristicsthat
Hall and Brace (1994a, 1994b) found to be associatedwith supportfor the death
penalty.Thus, it is expected that conservativevotes will be more likely if the victim was female, elderly, or a police officer. In addition, the model below tests
their expectationsthat conservative decisions are more likely if the murderoccurred in conjunction with a rape or a robbery or if multiple murders were
committed. George and Epstein's (1992) analysis of death penalty decisions by
the U.S. SupremeCourt suggests that liberal decisions are more likely if the defendant was charged with some crime other than intentional murder or if the
defendant argued that the death penalty should be overturnedbecause the jury
was death qualified.10
The model of gender discriminationdecisions includes several variables derived from Supreme Court precedent.First, liberal decisions are expected to be
more likely when the challenged statutediscriminateson its face or the law is a
civil ratherthan a criminal regulation. Second, equal protection doctrine recognizes that if males and females are not similarlysituatedin regardto the activity
at issue, then differenttreatmentdoes not violate equal protection.Therefore,a
statute defended on the grounds that there are "real differences" between the
sexes should have a better chance of being upheld than one not based on such
substantialdifferences. Similarly,the claim that the differentialtreatmentis "benign" may also increase the chances that the challenged action will be upheld.
Therefore, the presence of either of these two defenses should decrease the
chance of a liberal vote. In addition, equal protection claims often turn on the
level of scrutiny employed by the courts. Therefore, the higher the level of
scrutinythatthe governmentconcedes should be employed,the more likely a liberal vote.11
The model of obscenity decisions includes three indicatorsof the type of material alleged to be obscene: whether the materialwas primarilywritten text, a
film, or from a magazine. Dummy variableswere createdfor each of these tvnes
'?For furtherdetails on the details of the coding of these variables,see Hall and Brace 1994a and
George and Epstein 1992.
" For furtherelaborationon the conceptualizationof these variablesand the details of their coding, see Crews-Meyerand Anderson 1994.
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of material,taking the value 1 if the materialalleged to be obscene was of that
type and coded 0 otherwise. The excluded category was live entertainmentthat
was alleged to be obscene. In addition, courts were expected to grant governments more powerto regulatematerialintendedfor children.Finally,courts were
expected to be more likely to make a liberal decision when the defendants
claimed a FirstAmendmentviolation and less likely to make a liberal decision
when the defendant'sprimaryclaim was that scienter was not established.Each
of these variableswas coded 1 if present and 0 if not present.
Religion and Judges' Votes
The three models of Supreme Court decision making presentedbelow allow
the investigationof the effect of judges' religious affiliationon their voting behavior under controls for judicial preferences, changing Supreme Court policy,
contextual and institutionalvariation,and case facts appropriatefor each issue
area.The findings are presentedin tables 2-4. To test each of the directionalhypotheses describedabove, one-tailedtests of statisticalsignificance are reported.
The results for death penalty cases are presented in Table 2. Judicial preferences appear to be strongly related to the voting choices of the judges. Party
TABLE2

Logit Analysis of the Impact of Judges' Religion on the Likelihood
of a Liberal Vote in State Supreme Courts in Death Penalty, Obscenity,
and Gender Discrimination Cases, 1970-1993
Independent
Variables
Partyidentification
Prosecutor
SupremeCourtpolicy
State Citizen ideology
Electedjudge
Partycompetition
Evangelical
Catholic
Jewish

Death
Penalty
MLE
(SE)

Obscenity
MLE
(SE)

Gender
Discrimination
MLE
(SE)

0.355***
(.102)
-0.139*
(.071)
-0.441***
(.030)
0.033***
(.003)
0.131
(.077)
-0.014***
(.003)
-.324***
(.094)
-0.212*
(.119)
0.256
(.179)

0.348**
(.119)
0.152
(.096)
-0.147**
(0.50)
0.032***
(.003)
-0.092
(.100)
-0.009*
(.004)
-0.446*
(.197)
-0.369**
(.137)
-0.101
(.279)

-0.416
(.312)
0.016
(.009)
0.234
(.141)
0.066***
(.012)
0.323
(.302)
-0.058***
(.014)
-0.689*
(.352)
0.098
(.304)
0.430
(.606)

TABLE2
Independent
Variables
Femalevictim
Police victim
Multiplemurders
Rape
Robbery
Death-qualifiedjury
Crime

continued

Death
Penalty
MLE
(SE)

Obscenity
MLE
(SE)

Gender
Discrimination
MLE
(SE)

0.065
(.054)
0.097
(.061)
-0.657***
(.085)
-0.670***
(.123)
-0.089
(.075)
0.543***
(.076)
0.026
(.119)

Film

0.102
(.103)
0.509
(.313)
0.113

Text
Pictoral

(.111)

Adults
FirstAmendment

-0.243**
(.098)
-0.408

Scienter

-0.605***

(.101)
(.155)

Facial

-0.733*
(.337)
-0.935**
(.331)
-0.437
(.310)
0.454
(.315)
-0.051

Policy type
Benign
Real differences
Scrutiny

(.105)

Intercept

1.581
(.337)

-0.030
(.480)

0.712
(1.393)

Mean of dependentvariables
Number of cases
Percentcategorized
correctly
-2 X LLR
Model Chi-square
df

.44
3909

.42
2023

.33
437

63.9
4913
455
16

63.3
2600
160
15

86.9
464
92
14

p <

.0001

.0001

.0001

*p < .05
**p < .01
*** p < .001
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identificationis arguablyonly a very rough indicatorof differencesin the political values of judges. Nevertheless, the coefficient for this variableis robust and
statistically significant. That is, in death penalty cases, Democratic judges are
substantiallymore likely than their Republican colleagues to cast liberal votes
under controls for variationsin changing precedentand contextualpressures.In
contrast,the association between prosecutorialexperience and judicial votes is
negative, indicating that former prosecutors are significantly more likely than
other judges to vote to uphold the death penalty. These findings strongly reinforce the conclusions of other studies that have found that the political values of
appellate courtjudges are importantinfluences on judicial decisions.
Influences from the legal subculturealso appearto have importanteffects on
judicial votes. The decisions of state court judges become significantly more
conservativeas the SupremeCourtshifted steadily to the right duringthe Burger
and Rehnquist Courts. While the control variable used to capture changing
SupremeCourtpolicy providesonly a rough indicatorof changingprecedent,the
results are consistent with the expectationthatjudges are responsiveto some influences from the legal subculture.Togetherwith the findings on the influence of
the political preferencesof judges, these results provide strong confirmationfor
the assertion of Richardsonand Vines (1970) and others thatjudicial votes can
best be understoodas a resultantof the sometimes conflictingpressuresfrom the
legal and democraticsubcultures.
While it is increasingly common for studies of appellate court decision making to examine the effects of both judicial attitudes and legal influences,
contextualeffects have been less frequentlyexamined.The analysis presentedin
table 2 suggests that these oversights may be unfortunate.The association between the citizen ideology of each state and the patternof judicial decisions is
strongand statisticallysignificant.Judges from conservativestates were substantially more likely to cast conservativevotes thantheir brethrenimmersedin more
liberal cultures.
Overall, the results of the analysis in Table 2 demonstratethe utility of integratedmodels of judicial decision making. The results for obscenity and gender
discriminationcases reportedin Table2 are similar.They suggest that no singlefactor explanations of judicial behavior (e.g., mechanical jurisprudenceor the
AttitudinalModel) are satisfactoryaccounts of voting on state supremecourts.
Instead,judicial decisions appear to be the result of the interactionsamong a
complex set of forces includingjudicial values, legal forces, and contextualpressures. As predicted from earlier studies, Democratic judges are substantially
more liberal than their Republicancolleagues, and formerprosecutorsare more
conservative.But judicial attitudesare not the whole story; the decisional trends
of state courtjudges were also highly responsive to the changing trends on the
SupremeCourt.
Turningto the main focus of this analysis, the effect of judges' religious affiliations is also evident in the model of death penalty decisions. As can be seen
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from table 2, evangelicaljudges were significantlymore likely to vote to uphold
the death penalty than were either mainline Protestantsor Jewish judges, and
they were marginallymore supportiveof the death penalty than were Catholics.
These findings are analogousto the findings from studies of the mass public that
have found that evangelicalstend to supporta strong"law and order"orientation.
Within the context of this integratedmodel of judicial decision making, the
religious affiliation of the judges appears to exert a substantial influence. As
hypothesized,evangelicaljudges were substantiallymore likely to cast conservative votes than their mainline Protestantbrethreneven after the effects of party,
prosecutorialexperience, state citizen ideology, and changing Supreme Court
policy were accounted for. Catholicjudges were also more likely than mainline
Protestantsto support conservative outcomes, but they were less conservative
than the Protestantevangelicals. Jewish judges had voting patterns that were
similarto those of mainline Protestants.
The effects of religion in the obscenity decisions of the courts were similarto
those discovered in death penalty cases. Obscenity cases often involve choices
that most directly involve moral judgments that impinge on religous beliefs.
Evangelicals in a wide variety of settings tend to supporttraditionalvalues that
are hostile to tolerationof even soft-core pornography.Therefore,the results in
Table 2 are consistent with expectations derived from the general social and
moral orientationsof differentreligious groups. Evangelicaljudges were significantly more likely to vote to supportconservativeoutcomes in obscenity cases
than their mainline Protestantbrethren. In obscenity as in the death penalty
cases, Catholic judges also were significantlymore conservativethan mainline
Protestantsand in fact appear to be almost as conservative as the evangelical
judges.
The effects of religion are most clearly definedin gender discriminationcases.
Catholicjudges and Jewishjudges appearto be slightly more liberal than mainline Protestantjudges, but the differences fall short of the .05 level of statistical
significance. On the other hand, evangelical judges stand out as substantially
more likely to supportconservativedecisions thanjudges of any of the otherthree
religious groups. These results are consistent with studies of mass political behavior that have found adherentsof the new Religious Right to oppose abortion
and the ERA and to favorthe maintenanceof traditionalgender distinctions.The
coefficients presented in Table 2 indicate that these differences are statistically
significantin spite of the relatively small sample size for gender discrimination
cases. The datain Table2 also indicatethatthe differencein the probabilityof liberal votes being cast by evangelicals compared to judges of other religions is
greaterthan the differencebetween Democratsand Republicans.
In all three issue areas,the coefficients for a numberof the case facts included
in the models appearto suggest that the state courts are responsive to Supreme
Court precedent.For example, precedentcreates a strong presumptionthat sale
of sexually explicit materialsto minors is more subjectto governmentregulation
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TABLE3

Estimated Probabilities of a Liberal Vote for Different
Combinations of Religion and Political Party
Issue Area
Party

Religion

Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican

Evangelical
MainlineProtestant
Evangelical
MainlineProtestant

Death Penalty

Obscenity

GenderDiscrimination

.407
.487
.326
.399

.363
.472
.282
.379

.195
.324
.202
.335

than sale of similar materialto adults. Thus, if courts are responsive to precedent, prosecutionsfor sales to minors should carry a higher probabilityof being
upheld than sales to adults (i.e., conservativedecisions will be more likely when
the sales are to minors).The strongnegative coefficient for the variablethat captured whether the action targeted children or adults is consistent with this
predictedeffect of precedent.More importantly,the addition of controls for the
most relevantcase facts in each of the three issue areas examinedhave virtually
no effect on the strengthof the relationshipbetweenjudges' religious affiliation
and their tendency to supportthe liberal position. Even under controls for these
case facts, evangelicaljudges in all three issue areas tended to supportthe conservativeposition to a significantlygreaterextent than their mainline Protestant
and Jewish brethren(and in gender discriminationcases they were also substantially more likely than Catholicjudges to supportthe conservativeposition).
While the MLE coefficients in Table2 can be used to indicate the directionality and (along with the standarderror) statistical significance of the effect of
each independentvariable,the magnitudeof the coefficient is not readily interpretable.Therefore,we present in Table 3 an illustrationof the difference that
judges' religion can make in the probabilityof a liberal vote for judges of each
party in each of the three issue areas. The estimated probabilitiesderived from
the MLE coefficients in Table 2 assume that the values of all variables except
those for party and religion are set at their mean values. The data show thatwhen
political party is controlled,the effect of changing from a mainline Protestantto
an evangelicaljudge decreasesthe probabilityof a liberal vote from 8 to 13 percentage points, dependingon the issue area.While the magnitudeof this impact
is moderate, it should be noted that it is essentially the same as the effect of
changing the party of the judge while holding the religion constant.
Conclusions
Our analysis of the decisions of state supremecourtjustices who are evangelicals providesevidence to supportthe claim thatjudges' religion has an influence
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on those votes in the areas of gender discrimination,obscenity, and the death
penalty. The relationship discovered between the religion and votes of state
supremecourtjudges is most likely a reflectionof the connectionbetweenjudges'
religious affiliationand their attitudes.12 This is a significantfindingin thatwe see
that includingreligion in the group of characteristicscommonly used by judicial
scholars to explain judicial votes uncovers effects that have been previously
missed. Controllingfor partyidentification,prosecutorstatus,SupremeCourtpolicy, citizen ideology and institutionalcharacteristicsof the state, and the relevant
case facts does not negate the impact of religion. Religious denominationhas an
independentand notableeffect on judicial decision making even when these control variables have notable effects of their own. This suggests that religious
affiliationrepresentsa set of influenceson the developmentof the values ofjudges
that are separatefrom the partisansources thathave been frequentlystudied.
One implication of these findings is that future studies employing the
Attitudinal Model of judicial decision making should not place exclusive reliance on judges' political party as the sole surrogatefor their values. Instead,a
combinationof political party and religious affiliationmay provide a better indicator of the values of state courtjudges.
The effect of religion on the votes of evangelicaljustices is detectabledespite
the relativelyrough indicatorof denominationalaffiliationthat we employ. Other
studies delve even deeper into the relationshipsbetween issues such as religious
salience (Guth and Green 1991), doctrinalbeliefs (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993),
churchinvolvementand attendance(Wald,Kellstedt, and Leege 1993) and political involvementof evangelicals.The indicationsare that these variablesdo have
effects on evangelicalpolitics, and futureresearchin the area of judicial decision
making with regardto religion should attemptto addressthem.
As a result of these limitations,the present analysis probablyunderestimates
the effects of religion on judges' votes in these cases. The fact that they are, nevertheless, evident in our analysis suggests that the influence religion has on
politics in the electorateis presentto some degree in the realm of political elites
andjudicial decision making.
ManuscriptsubmittedI May 1997
Final manuscriptreceived 26 May 1998
12The conclusion that attitudesprovide the link between religious affiliationand judges' votes is
supportedby the finding that when only nonunanimousdecisions of the courts are examined,the relationship is substantially stronger. Specifically, for nonunanimous decisions, the coefficient for
evangelicals in death penalty cases is -.700 (compared to -.324 in all death decisions), and in
obscenity cases it is -.848 (compared to -.446 in all obscenity decisions). Only in gender
discrimination cases is it lower (-.553 compared to -.689). Since it is widely believed that
nonunanimouscases tend to be the kind of cases in which judges are freer to vote their ideological
preferences,the strong findings in these cases reinforcethe attitudinalinterpretationof the effects of
religious affiliation.
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